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Abstract 
Much of modern society is founded on orchestrating institutions that produce social goods by 
fostering motivated teams, pitting them against each other, and distributing the fruits of the arms 
races that ensue. These “market makers” can be seen as effectively organizing competitive teams 
into engines of innovation, especially to the extent that techniques and resources diffuse from out 
of the most innovative teams over time. However, even when the market maker is willing and able 
to maintain parity between teams, it may fail to maintain a level playing field, as some teams 
acquire enough advantage within the system to gain influence over it and institutionalize their 
advantage. Whether this happens can be determined indirectly by investigating if the competitions 
arranged by a market maker become more deterministic over time. If chance begins to play an 
equal or greater role in determining contests, that is evidence that the competitive advantages that 
teams develop are diffusing more quickly than they accumulate. But if the better team tends with 
increasing consistency to beat worse teams, that is evidence for a divergence in team ability that 
reflects a potential institutional inequality, as the few top performing teams use their advantage to 
hoard gains. Using outcomes of over 60,000 games from four leagues and more than 100 years’ 
worth of seasons, we compute the evolving rate of transitivity violations (A > B, B > C, but C > 
A) to measure the ability of leagues to maintain parity between teams, and support the efficient 
generation and distribution of innovation. Comparing against a baseline of randomly permuted 
outcomes, we find that basketball has become less competitive over time, suggesting that teams 
diverge in performance, and reflecting a possible failure of market makers to tame their 
overpowered teams. This finding is especially notable given that, in the domain of professional 
sports, market makers are clearly incentivized to actively maintain a level playing field. Our results 
suggest that rich-get-richer dynamics are so pernicious that they can even emerge under the watch 
of a powerful administrator that is motivated to prevent them. 
I. Introduction 
Goal-oriented human teams are a major driver of social and economic activity around the world, 
particularly when they compete. Much of modern society is founded on institutions that produce 
social goods by pitting motivated teams against each other and distributing the fruits of their 
unending struggles. These “market makers” — funding agencies, managers of work or sports 
teams, actual markets — can be seen as effectively orchestrating competitive teams into 
“innovation engines,” as teams’ incentives move them to continually innovate, and their advances 
diffuse through the system.  
However, the institutions that emerge to orchestrate team-level competitions do not just play a 
static puppet master role, they can also evolve in how they structure inter-team contests. For 
example, imagine an institution that has been organizing multi-team contests for many years.  How 
does that institution’s development affect its ability to not just foster, but spread innovation, and 
advance the performance of the entire system? If the institution and its member teams become 
more professional, whether in response to more experience, the diffusion of innovation, or the 
opportunity to gain greater resources, should we expect some teams to preferentially capture and 
retain their advantages (“the rich get richer”) or for the community of teams to improve together 
over time (“a rising tide lifts all boats”)? While these are not necessarily mutually exclusive, an 
understanding of their relative influences, and trends over time, can inform the ability of the market 
maker to manage its constituents. 
In this study, we observe professionalized basketball teams organized into leagues which have 
competed in the same round-robin fashion for several decades.  These teams have had rotating 
memberships through this duration but have maintained largely stable corporate identities. During 
this time, the rules and practices of the league have evolved, its resources and level of 
professionalization have increased dramatically, and society’s level of engagement with the league 
has increased, attracting an ever greater pool of human capital to its teams, as the teams themselves 
have become ever more highly skilled. What should be the effect of the league’s growth and 
professionalization on how its teams learn from each other?  
We can measure this by asking a more specific question: do the outcomes of contests between 
teams become more, less, or equally competitive over time? As the ecosystem of teams gains more 
resources, should member teams diverge from each other in ability, with the best getting better? 
Should they approach each other in ability, perhaps as play approaches human cognitive limits, 
and this ceiling effect reduces the role of performance in determining outcomes, relative to noise? 
Or should arms race dynamics nullify the effects of other changes and keep team performance 
differences unchanged? This last hypothesis, reminiscent of Louis Carroll’s Red Queen’s race 
(“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place”) highlights a 
connection to evolutionary arms races predicted by evolutionary biology’s Red Queen hypothesis 
(Stenseth and Maynard Smith 1984), but in a business rather than biological evolutionary context 
(Barnett and Hansen 1996).  
By distinguishing these theories within a league of teams, we gain insight into how that league 
may be driven by inter-team dynamics. If basketball becomes more competitive over time, then 
innovations in the sport are likely to be diffusing quickly through a system, with team-level 
competitive advantages apparent only transiently, from season to season. Conversely, if contests 
are becoming less competitive, innovations would seem to be pooling among some competitors 
and not diffusing throughout the network, despite any of the league’s efforts to the contrary. 
II. Background    
A. Innovation and resource distribution across firms 
By intent, market makers protect the environments conducive to the “creative-destruction” 
envisioned by Schumpeter that leads to innovation, diffusion and growth. Here, we stretch more 
business-focused conceptions of innovation — such as “the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new 
organizational method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations” (OECD 
2005) — to include the development of new strategies, techniques, and practices in excelling at a 
team sport. In both, innovation promotes attention to efficiency both in process and outcome and 
can feature as a fundamental condition of wider changes to management, organizational design, 
and the wider culture of society (Barnett 1953; Abrahamson 1991). The benefits of innovation, 
however, rests on its ability to diffuse (Robertson, 1967). As stated in the GNU Manifesto, 
“creativity can be a social contribution, but only insofar as society is free to use the results” 
(Stallman, 1985). Market makers try to ensure that the distribution of resources does not become 
so unbalanced so as to inhibit access to the benefits of innovation (Hsieh and Klenow 2009; Kogan 
et al. 2017).  
Absent an effective system to regulate or incentivize the protection of a competitive market, 
innovating firms can go to tremendous lengths to retain exclusive access to their advances, even 
when the result is market failure (Barney 1991).  Blind emphasizes that the market makers in an 
innovation system can be “influenced or pressurised by progress in science and technology” in the 
long run (2012). Market makers must adapt to innovation over time, as firms within them seek to 
accumulate resources and exclude competitors from accessing innovations. Otherwise, market 
makers can become vulnerable to regulatory capture, a process of interest in industrial economics, 
in which a single market actor, usually a monopolist, gains access to the regulatory process and 
uses it to institutionalize their advantage. 
The problem of runaway concentrations of power is general to social science.  In organization 
science it is evident in fat-tailed distributions of firm size (Simon and Bonini 1958). In economics 
it can be seen not just in the emergence of monopolists (Encaoua and Jacquemin 1980), but in the 
kind of income inequalities observed by Vilfredo Pareto (1935). In sociology, researchers in the 
science of science identified comparable disparities in citation patterns (Dion et al. 2018), and even 
the degree distributions of online friendship networks (Ahn et al. 2007; Ugander et al 2011). 
Network scientists have identified dozens of mechanisms that can produce skewed “hub and 
spoke” networks from balanced networks (Clauset et al. 2015).  In political science, runaway 
power dynamics are the basis of theories like the Iron Law of Oligarchy (Michels 1915), which 
suggests that democracies are inherently vulnerable to the emergence of a ruling class of oligarchs. 
Although much work argues that these dynamics are built into “social physics,”(Radicchi et al 
2008; Barabási and Albert 1999) one might suppose that a high-powered outside administrator 
with a motivation to ensure balance among agents would be sufficient to prevent the concentration 
of power among them. Basketball provides precisely such a case, and its success or failure at 
managing emergent power dynamics provides a test of whether rich-get-richer dynamics are so 
endemic to human affairs that they emerge even in systems that explicitly try to design them away.   
The market makers that coordinate professionalized sporting entertainment, such as basketball 
administrative offices, commissioners, and owners’ committees, have sought to collaborate to 
structure the “on-court” and “off-court” rules of the league in ways that protect competitive 
balance. The annual draft, a system for matching junior players to teams, is structured as a 
rebalancing matching system that assigns the strongest players to the weakest teams.  The NBA’s 
salary control measures have been implemented to incentivize teams to stay within a range of 
comparable franchise expenditures on player salaries (Hausman and Leonard, 1997). While 
advancements in fitness regimes and the formalization of data analytics as part of scouting and 
game preparation have naturally diffused throughout professionalized basketball, some 
technologies required additional coordination. One such example is the NBA’s league-wide 
introduction of SportVU, an optical tracking technology that assists in performance analysis 
(Westney, 2013). League administrators across the professional sports industry intervene in these 
instances to raise the floors and ceilings of possible performance for all teams, and to generate 
uncertainty, even as teams try to become predictable in their dominance (Merritt and Clauset, 
2014).  
Still, league administrators face a fundamental tension with the network of team franchises that 
make up a league, and there is anecdotal evidence that the NBA, for example, has long been 
compromised by capture. As teams seek to maximize dominance in their favor (at least in the long 
run) by utilizing innovations for competitive advantage, league administrators seek to maintain fan 
interest in an ideally uncertain outcome.  The risk, in this setting, is that a single team might wield 
so much influence over, for example, fans and profits, as to gain leverage over league-level 
decision making, as administrator’s perceive short-term commercial benefit from tolerating the 
dominance of one team, at the long-term cost of the parity that undergirds professionalized athletic 
contests.  
Protecting a sport’s competitiveness while remaining efficient in outcomes is the regulatory 
challenge of league administrators during the long-run innovation cycles of a competitive system. 
In recent years, league administrators in professional basketball have faced three particular 
challenges in efforts to maintain competitive balance among a system of competing franchises. 
First, administrators in basketball have struggled with the advent of dominant teams consisting of 
top-level individual performers who have decided to pool labor in one destination to ensure a 
greater probability of success. In some cases, these “super-teams” have been observed to achieve 
predicted levels of dominance leading to discussions for regulating communication between teams 
(Wojnarowski and Lowe, 2019). Second, at the other end of the spectrum, less-skilled teams face 
structural incentives to lose a greater amount of games toward the end of a season in order to gain 
preferential opportunities in future talent acquisition via the annual draft. Despite the introduction 
and subsequent reforms of a draft lottery to prevent “tanking” a season, lower-skilled teams seem 
to systematically lose at a higher rate later in a season (Price et al. 2010). Third, league 
administrators face a degree of short-term benefits from permitting extended runs of a single 
team’s dominance, contextually evident in the growth of global interest in the NBA during the 
Bulls 1990 dynasty. However, this comes at the risk of losing fan interest outside of the dominant 
team’s viewer market which would cut into league revenue in the long-run. 
B. The structure of professional basketball 
National professionalized basketball began in 1946 with the founding of an eleven-team league 
called the Basketball Association of America (BAA). After three seasons, the BAA became the 
National Basketball Association (NBA), and after enduring a ten-year competition with the rival 
American Basketball Association from 1967 to 1976, the NBA has gone on to become the most 
prominent professionalized men’s basketball league in the world today. The Women’s National 
Basketball Association was founded in 1997 with eight teams and continues to play today as the 
professionalized basketball league with the second-longest existence behind the NBA. Having 
access to several semi-independent, and at some points competing, leagues enables us to compare 
several comparable cases, towards a more general claim. 
Despite dramatic changes in rules, including the introduction of the three-point line in 1978, and 
evolutions in labor mobility through free-agency, the basic structure of professionalized basketball 
has largely remained the same. Teams have played roughly the same amount of games each season, 
and unlike most other sports of comparable scale, the round-robin schedule structure has existed 
from the beginning of professionalized basketball and persists to today: professionalized basketball 
teams have consistently played every other franchise in the league membership since the founding 
of the BAA. The well-balanced round-robin structure of professional basketball seasons, with each 
team in a division playing all others the same number of times, was a major factor in our choice 
of basketball for this analysis over other professional sports. This is not the case in comparably 
popular professional sports like baseball and American football (but similar to ice hockey). As 
opposed to the more tourney-like structure of these other sports, two teams will compete 
independent of relative skill, and high-performing teams will not be oversampled. The round-robin 
structure therefore allows direct estimation of the performance difference of most pairs of teams 
(by directly estimating that performance difference), which has the additional side effect of 
facilitating comparisons across seasons within leagues, and to some extent across leagues. 
Helping to manage the scaling problems of a round-robin design, a square increase in number of 
games for every unit increase in the number of teams, large basketball leagues are divided into 
conferences, which are divided further into divisions.  Teams in each subunit play a series of 
preplanned round-robins. Once the regular season is over, the best teams are elevated to league-
level playoffs, which follow more of a tournament design. We therefore restrict our attention to 
regular season play. Other features of basketball make it amenable for the method utilized here. 
As a national, professionalized, and very popular sport, it has a long history of advancement in 
tactics, ability, scouting, etc., and has witnessed a large number of observations (games). It is a 
fast-paced and short game, which supports a very large number of games (observations) in a 
standard season (currently over 1200). And, basketball games never end in a tie result, which 
means that every game contributes clear signal.  
In the maturation of a professional league over time, the competing interests among the 
memberships of teams can exert pressure on league administrators. As teams seek to sustain their 
competitive advantages, how do league administrators protect the competitiveness on which the 
sport depends? 
III. Method 
We test three competing hypotheses using competitive results from four leagues of professional 
basketball.The dataset we introduce consists of over 60,000 observations between the years 1946 
and 2019 that include the home team, the visiting team, and the final score for two contemporary 
major professional basketball associations (NBA and WNBA) as well as two historical 
professional associations (ABA and BAA). Seasons which were shortened due to lockout (NBA 
1998–99 and NBA 2011–12) or due to the disbandment of an association (ABA 1975–1976) were 
thrown out due to insufficient games between teams.  
Our study imposes a few assumptions on the data. We assume that basketball has changed, and 
that the basketball teams of today would outcompete comparably ranked basketball teams of the 
past, whether due to increased resources, skill, or some other consequence of growth and 
professionalization in the sport. From this starting point we ask whether randomness has come to 
play a greater, lesser, or equal role in determining game outcomes.  
[[Figure 1 here]] 
 
A. Transitivity Violation Test 
To measure the competitiveness of team contests we measure the number of transitivity violations 
over each season’s games. For each season, we repeatedly selected groups of three teams at 
random, and then three games in which each was matched with the other two (Figure 1). Within 
these triples, if Team A won its game against Team B, who then defeated Team C in their game, 
transitivity is achieved if A beat C in the third game (A>B>C). If Team A lost to team C, we 
considered this transitivity violated. One advantage of this measure is that it has natural upper and 
lower bounds. In a sport in which noise plays no role and skill determines outcomes completely 
(one akin to running), transitivity violations should be zero. And in a game of chance, transitivity 
violations should be at a maximum. For example, Rock Paper Scissors, a game of chance, should 
be maximally intransitive: Whether Player A beat Player B, and B beat C, should offer no 
information as to whether Player A will beat C. The transitivity violation rate is in this sense a 
general measure of the determinism of contests. 
Our argument is that a change in transitivity violations over seasons is evidence about the game-
by-game competitiveness of a sport. However, other factors may impact the rate of transitivity 
violations over time.  To address this,, we developed a  baseline to control for the expansion or 
contraction of the league membership, the organization of teams in divisions, and other season-
dependent confounding factors which can also change the rate of transitivity violations across 
seasons. Therefore, we do not report the observed transitivity violations raw. Instead, we 
subtracted from the observed rate a season-level “baseline” transitivity violation rate that 
randomized final scores. To create this intransitivity baseline, we shuffled all results within each 
season to produce a random dataset of permuted competitions and outcomes, and computed an 
average baseline transitivity rate over 5000 replicates of this procedure. With this baseline, we can 
control for confounding cross-season effects on transitivity and focus entirely on within-season 
effects on transitivity, such as our mechanisms of interest. By this procedure, we found a baseline 
rate of  violations of transitive ordering of around 25% for each season, but with a slightly upward 
slope, due at least to growth, in all leagues, in the number of teams with basketball’s increasing 
popularity over decades. See Figure S1 in the supplementary section for a direct comparison of the 
baseline and observed intransitivity rates. 
Finally, we subtracted this intransitivity baseline from the observed rate, resulting in a differential 
measure that accounts for the distance between the slope of the observed rate and the constant rate 
of transitivity violations in the intransitivity baseline. 
To compare the results of the transitivity test against season-by-season results, we also measured 
the standard deviation of winning percentage of teams in each league across the seasons in the 
dataset. Unlike win totals, which fluctuate based on the number of competitions and teams 
organized into a league, winning percentage provides a normalized measure of overall success. 
B. Hypotheses 
We the authors could not agree on a hypothesis amongst ourselves, setting this up as an exciting 
test. Under the first hypothesis, which proposes that leagues cannot prevent teams from diverging 
in skill over time, we would expect higher levels of transitivity violations in 1946 than in 2019. In 
other words, the transitive relationship holds true with greater frequency, resulting in greater 
competitive imbalance. If Team B beats Team C, then Team A beats both Team B and Team C 
with greater frequency today than in the past.  
Under the second hypothesis, which proposes that the market maker manages competitive balance 
more effectively over time, and skill differentials become smaller, we would expect to see lower 
rates of transitivity violations in 1946 compared to 2019. This hypothesizes that teams compete 
under greater parity on a game by game basis, thus creating more illogical, intransitive outcomes 
that result more from idiosyncratic events than differentials in innovation or skill.  
Under the third, the “Red Queen” hypothesis, the rate of transitivity violations should be about 
constant over time as innovations diffuse across the population of teams at the same rate they 
accumulate, resulting in relatively little change in the predictivity of the competitive ranking of 
three randomly chosen teams and matches. This hypothesis would be best supported by a failure 
to falsify a null hypothesis of zero effect of time on transitivity. 
IV. Results    
Figure 2 shows the difference between the observed and baseline transitivity violation rates over 
time by league. We found that, relative to baseline, the difference in the transitivity violation rate 
has increased. In a random draw of three teams, a dominant team emerges more often. This result 
was based on a linear regression with the difference in observed and baseline transitivity violation 
rates as the dependent variable, a covariate for season and dummy variables for league (Table 1). 
Standard errors are robust for heteroskedasticity. Professionalized basketball has become less 
competitive  over time, as measured by the number of seasons since the league’s inauguration 
(t(94)=–2.053; p<0.05; Figure 2, Table 1). In addition to the overall decrease in transitivity 
violations over time, we find that the observed rate of transitivity violations was lower than the 
baseline for all leagues.  This finding is consistent with the (already undisputed) belief that 
basketball is more than a game of chance, serving as a sanity or face validity check for the overall 
suitability of our problem formulation.  
To explore alternative explanations of our result, and establish its robustness, we specified a 
second model (Table 1, second column) that replaced a league’s season number with another time 
variable: the calendar year when the season was played. In the second model this other temporal 
covariate also correlates negatively with transitivity violation rate. However, in a post hoc third 
model combining both calendar year and league age, the two temporal variables seem to become 
redundant and the WNBA variable drops from the model due to a negative multicollinear 
relationship with the NBA (correlation = –0.753). If there were enough diffusion from the oldest 
leagues to the WNBA at its founding in 1997, the variables-of-interest in models one and two--
calendar year and season number--might have differed in both result and significance. We interpret 
the null result of the third model as indicating no such divergence in interpretation, but rather that 
the two specifications of time are quite redundant. 
Our main model finds that the same overall decrease in transitivity also holds within each league, 
with the exception of the WNBA. The fourth model is a post hoc regression in response to the 
WNBA’s disparate trendline. Applying our primary model to only the WNBA data, we find that 
the positive trendline apparent in Figure 2 is not statistically different from 0. 
The overall finding is consistent with our first hypothesis, that team-level advances in how to play 
basketball have created a  divergence in performance among the ecosystem of teams and fewer 
competitive outcomes. This interpretation is supported by a corroborative analysis which shows 
an increase in the gap in winning percentage between the strongest and weakest teams, across all 
leagues  (t(100)=2.328, p<0.05; Figure 3; Table 3). The regression, with the standard deviation of 
the winning percentage as the dependent variable and standard errors robust for heteroskedasticity, 
shows that the distribution of wins in an average season seems to be less equal over time. 
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When disaggregating by league, the NBA’s longevity allows for the most interpretability. A 
random selection of three games relating three teams has resulted in a lower frequency of transitive, 
competitive outcomes relative to random baseline. The same trend shows for the more limited 
tenures of the BAA and the ABA. Competition in all three major men’s professional basketball 
associations demonstrates a trend toward lower levels of parity, at least in the regular season. These 
results could be due to any of the many consequences of the professionalization of basketball over 
seventy years, including changes in practices, salaries, recruitment practices, and talent pools. To 
return to the analogy of regulatory capture, between some sub-group of “super-teams,” a group of 
“tanking” teams, or a complicit league, certain teams seem to have sufficiently overcome the 
league’s regulatory processes to institutionalize an advantage that manifests in a reduction of the 
unpredictability of the sport. The WNBA may or may not be an exception to this trend.   
V. Discussion 
Capture and other symptoms of runaway rich-get-richer dynamics are evident in every field: 
organization science, industrial economics, sociology and social network analysis, and political 
science. It is not bad by definition, but can, in each domain, be associated with the emergence of 
a qualitatively new type of overpowered agent. The main implication of our work is that these 
runaway dynamics are strong enough to emerge even in the presence of a single, high-powered 
administrator with a responsibility, and incentives, to prevent that emergence.  We cannot conclude 
from this work how the administrator failed. Do teams develop strategies to insulate themselves 
from the administrator’s authority? Do dominating teams bring enough resources to the league that 
it becomes willing to sacrifice parity for revenue? A better understanding of mechanisms for 
capture will lend insight into the difficult problem of preventing the runaway accumulation of 
resources endemic to so many social systems in so many disciplines. 
While significant research inside and outside of sports has measured the interactions and 
relationships of competitive teams in a network, another line of investigation that is ready for 
attention is that of the orchestrating agents in the organizing system, whom we have called the 
market makers. The market maker exists as an interested party, with distinct goals and motivations 
from that of teams. As the teams in each professional basketball league vie for sustained 
dominance, leagues work in the opposite direction, attempting to ensure that contests remain 
unpredictable. The market makers, the league administrators, have a mandate and substantial 
power to protect the competitive balance of the network, promote ongoing innovation, and nurture 
the game’s appeal to basketball’s audience, the public. Many innovations in basketball mitigate 
the ability of dominant teams to achieve complete dominance, but the tendency toward the pooling 
of resources has permitted decreased competitiveness among teams, however modest, despite the 
efforts of the leagues. 
VI. Limitations and Future Work 
While the overall trendlines, being linear fits, seem continuous, it is worth considering whether 
there are jumps in transitivity rate that correspond to league-level rule changes.  A few of the more 
prominent rule-changes may have had an impact on competitiveness. The introduction of the shot-
clock in 1954 markedly increased scoring. The three-point line was installed in 1977. The draft 
has undergone multiple reforms, most significantly in 1989 and most recently in 2019. Instant 
replay was introduced in 2002 and has since expanded. SportVU cameras were installed in 10 
arenas in 2012, but then gained league-wide installation the following year. We do not consider 
these possibilities quantitatively, but, at least to the eye, any discontinuities associated with these 
dates do not stand out. Our proposition is that there is insufficient evidence of any single innovation 
disrupting the overall predictability trends. We do not find reason to reject that the effects of 
changes in basketball are largely incremental across time. 
At the conceptual level,we have favored a framing for this work that emphasizes the relationship 
between a network of competitors and the entity in charge of setting the terms of the iterative 
contests. Other mechanisms exist that could have explained this result with other outcomes which 
could have been consistent with a successful system for producing and diffusing innovation. 
For example, our behavioral and mechanistic focus masks broader social or institutional factors 
that may be driving our result.  Sports teams exist to make money, by attracting viewers, by hosting 
compelling contests. League administrators do enforce top-down regulations to promote 
rebalancing, and while we have measured the effectiveness against the “ceiling” of competitive 
balance, this study does not measure league administrator effectiveness against a completely 
unregulated environment. Further analysis could measure the differential between the results found 
here and a hypothetical, completely unmonitored sporting competition, a competitive “floor.”  
Alternatively, since skill levels in sports face a potential ceiling effect at the upper limit of human 
performance, some parity due to the reduced skill differences near the limit might mask capture of 
the market maker by the teams: if teams are already operating near the performance limits of 
humans in the sport, then rampant institutionalized power may not be evident in observed 
differentials. Innovation may be diffusing, and skill levels may be so close as to create 
idiosyncratic outcomes, but a sport league can still trend toward capture if the league 
administrators lose regulatory power over how teams accumulate resources. In this scenario, we 
simply selected the wrong dependent measure. 
Last, the method employed in this study falls in a distinct category between the in-game analysis 
of competitiveness using scoring events and the macro-scale analysis of team performance across 
decades (Ben-Naim et al., 2005; Price et al. 2010; Gabel and Redner, 2012; Merritt and Clauset, 
2013, 2014; Martín-González et al., 2016; Rockerbie, 2016). If results of similar studies arrive at 
different findings — and this work has alternatively identified the NBA as being overall more or 
less competitive than other sports depending on the unit of analysis used  — the general method 
for measuring the competitiveness  of a contest in any domain invites comparisons and a better 
understanding of when and how managing institutions successfully implement the diffusion of 
innovation. 
VII. Conclusion 
At every level of society, market makers structure competitive environments to harness uncertainty 
and unpredictability toward the generation of positive, network-wide benefits. At the same time, 
the teams they regulate work to gain an institutional advantage by gaining leverage over their 
market maker. This study utilizes data from professional basketball results to determine the degree 
to which team competitions, observed over decades, exhibit symptoms of “regulatory capture” by 
a subset of increasingly powerful teams, despite the active efforts of the manager class to maintain 
parity. Through the use of a transitivity violation test we determined that professional basketball 
exhibits decreased competitiveness amongst teams, suggesting some degree of success by 
individual competitors within the market to condition and capture regulator activity. By measuring 
the imbalanced  competitive relationships among contestants, this study suggests that capture is a 
phenomenon that is ubiquitous enough to appear even in systems that are managed by a powerful 
agent who is motivated to prevent it. 
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Tables and Figures  
Table 1: A regression shows separate season- and year-sensitive effects on transitivity over time. The dependent variable is the 
transitivity violation rate: the difference between observed and baseline intransitivity). Model 1 measures the difference in 
transitivity violation between the observed and baseline. For each season, transitivity violations drop at a statistically significant 
level. The same occurs when the calendar year is substituted for the season number as seen in Model 2. Using both time 
variables eliminates the effect of either, suggesting redundancy. Given the disparate trendline for the WNBA, the authors 
conducted an isolated post-hoc regressions,  seen in model 4, but found that the seasonal change in the rate of intransitivity does 
not significantly differ from 0 either when measuring based on the number of years since founding, or when accounting for the 
calendar year. 
 Season only Year only Season*Year WNBA only 
Season since 
league 
founding 
-0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
 -0.0218 
(0.0169) 
-0.0004 
(0.0012) 
     
Year  -0.0003* -0.0004  
  (0.0002) (0.0002)  
Season*Year    0.0000  
   (0.0000)  
ABA -0.0068 -0.0008 -0.0062  
 (0.0101) (0.0088) (0.0103)  
BAA -0.0208* -0.0218* -0.0293*  
 (0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0131)  
WNBA -0.0113  0.0045 NA  
 (0.0086) (0.0085)   
Intercept -0.0421***  0.5992 0.7511 -0.0527** 
 (0.0069) (0.3066) (0.4755) (0.0176) 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
95 95 94 20 
Adjusted R2  0.011 0.011 0.016 -0.044 
*p<0.05    
**p<0.01    
***p<0.001 
 
 
 
   
  
Table 2: Regression results. The dependent  variable is the standard deviation of winning percentage among teams in a league. 
Seasonal win-percentage distributions seem to have widened over time, substantiating the results of the transitivity violation test. 
 All leagues 
Season 0.0004* 
 (0.0002) 
ABA 0.0120 
 (0.0118) 
BAA 0.0289** 
 (0.0086) 
WNBA 0.0234* 
 (0.0093) 
Intercept 0.1353*** 
 (0.0089) 
Degrees of Freedom 100 
Adjusted R2  0.0604 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
 
    
Figure 1: Transitivity implies a coherent ordering of teams based on performance: if A beats B and B beats C then A should beat 
C. The more this ordering is observed in triplets of games, the more imbalanced that competitive relationship is. By contrast, if 
all three teams defeat each other, the result is an intransitive relationship with no clear dominance. We would expect high 
transitivity in a more skill-based game such as chess, and low transitivity in a game of chance like roulette. Changes in a game’s 
transitivity over time suggest a systematic change in that game’s predictability. We observe how this measure changes over time 
as one game, professional basketball, evolves over seven decades, interpreting changes in transitivity in terms of the competing 
interests of teams and the leagues that coordinate them. 
Transitivity 
 
Team is dominant 
 
Increase in transitivity 
suggests less parity and 
greater role of skill through 
increased competitive 
imbalance  
Transitivity Violation 
 
No team is dominant 
 
Increase in transitivity 
violations suggests greater 
parity and competitiveness 
  
 
  
Figure 2:Professional basketball has become less competitive over decades.  This decrease in parity of the game is consistent 
with a failure of leagues to prevent some teams from hoarding competitive advantage.  The y-axis measures the difference 
between the rate of transitivity violations in the observed set of basketball results minus the baseline rate of shuffled, permuted 
scores. With the exception of the WNBA, all professional basketball leagues feature a downward trendline, indicating transitivity 
violations are increasing as compared to a random baseline. With less intransitivity, basketball games feature less uncertainty, 
consistent with a divergence in the relative abilities of teams in each league, which is in turn consistent with a rich-get-richer 
dynamic that benefits top teams despite the supposed equalizing influence of the league.   
 
Figure 3: Professional basketball features a wider distribution of competitive success in 2019 compared to 1946, as measured by 
the standard deviation of teams’ seasonal winning percentage. This supports our argument that the increased determinism of 
basketball is due to the ability of top-performing teams to evade league control and institutionalize their competitive advantage. 
 
  
Supplementary Information 
Supplementary figure 1. After shuffling the scores within each season to create a within-season baseline for intransitivity , we can 
compare the results of this randomized result dataset to the real observed competitive rate of transitivity violations. This figure 
shows the underlying data trend that is analyzed in Figure 2: Figure 2 plots the difference between the observed and baseline data 
shown here. The result suggests a gradual decrease in transitivity violations, suggesting a trend toward less parity, that is 
counterbalanced in part, but not completely, by an increase over time in the baseline violation rate.  
 
